This book is a wide-ranging examination of rationalist thought in philosophy from ancient times to the present day. Written by a superbly qualified cast of philosophers Critically analyses the concept of rationalism Focuses principally on the golden age of rationalism in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Also covers ancient rationalism, nineteenth-century rationalism, and rationalist themes in recent thought Organised chronologically Various philosophical methods and viewpoints are represented.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Meaning in Spinoza’s MethodAlan Nelson and Noa SheinAaron V. Garrett. Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 240. Cloth, $60.00.This is a book about some fundamental aspects of Spinoza's mature metaphysics. The principal focus is on Part I of the Ethics concerning infinite substance, and on Part V concerning the intuitive knowledge that is the goal of philosophy. Within this focus, Garrett (...) concentrates on Spinoza's method. Garrett explains how he has been influenced by interpretations that stress the structural parallel between the synthetic, geometrical presentation of the Ethics and the relations among the ideas of the well-ordered mind. The Ethics proceeds by deriving propositions concerning substance's modes from definitions of substance and related notions while the mind, insofar as it is free from emotions, intuitively knows things as following from God. Garrett's distinctive thesis, however, is that Spinozistic enlightenment depends on the process of emending the intellect as described in one of Spinoza's earliest works, the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. While this work strongly foreshadows many of Spinoza's mature doctrines, its exposition much more closely resembles the analytic, non-geometric approach of Descartes's Meditations. Spinoza's therapy for the emendation of our "inadequate" ideas closely parallels Descartes's analytic therapy for making what he calls confused ideas "clear and distinct."Garrett is on firm ground in arguing that the process of enlightenment cannot be an unbroken chain of intuitive deductions. For one thing, the definitions and axioms printed in a copy of the Ethics are first sensed by the reader and are not likely to produce immediately the requisite adequate ideas (172). An example of one of Garrett's interesting conclusions is that the definition of God as consisting of an infinity of attributes, the sixth of Part I of the Ethics (1D6), is preliminary and replaced in the process of therapeutic emendation by a definition of God as self caused. It is only after our ideas have become adequate at the end of the process that we are able to fully appreciate 1D6 (171).One might think that Garrett does not go far enough here because his point can be naturally extended. Definitions might assist us in the process of bringing our adequate ideas to light, but our cognitive goal is making these ideas themselves adequate. What then are the ideas we can make most adequate and exactly what distinguishes them from highly refined ideas that are nevertheless more inadequate than these? On one interpretation it is divine essence, that is, the attributes of thought and extension that are individually most adequately conceived after successful therapy. It is tempting to suppose that a single idea of God as both thinking and extended would be more adequate still, but Spinoza holds that our conceptions of these attributes are "really distinct" in a sense analogous to Descartes's(1P10). Spinoza's 1D6 definition of God as a substance consisting of both these attributes (and perhaps other inconceivable ones) thus seems to indicate a subsumption of the attributes we can conceive under the image of some printed or spoken words. Such an idea would be more inadequate than our adequate conceptions of the individual attributes. One is here strongly reminded of Descartes's characterization in Article 63 of the first Part of his Principles of Philosophy, "... we more readily understand extended substance or thinking substance than substance alone."In his seventh and concluding chapter, Garrett tackles the grand problems of intuitive knowledge or knowledge of "the third kind" and the sense in which Spinoza thought a part of the human mind is eternal. The discussion is necessarily complex, but one great advantage of Garrett's treatment is that he realizes intuitive knowledge cannot consist in the explicit deduction of particular things from God. The detailed determination of particular "everyday objects" requires sensory knowledge which is, of course, never perfectly determinate and therefore inherently inadequate. But we can acquire the "second kind" of adequate knowledge by understanding what our minds have in common with other determinate, finite things. This finally enables us to ascend to an appreciation of these... (shrink)

Chapter 1 is introductory. It identifies a cluster of philosophical problems that arise in the foundations of neoclassical economic theory. Issues growing out of the unusually tenuous connection between the theory and the world are singled out as especially troublesome. Is it, after all, possible for economics to look more like an empirical science like physics than like of branch of mathematics? ;Chapter 2 argues that economic methodology has been constrained by the application of faulty philosophy of science, or by (...) the faulty application of philosophy of science. Economists with good intentions have wanted to protect economic theory from intrusions by "unscientific" constructs that had no clear operational criteria for their application. I argue that these attempts to protect economics went astray because theoretical constructs were consequently made to answer to an excessively stringent notion of economic data. Consequently, I find means to argue that all data and, in particular, psychological data about individual economic agents is relevant in the construction and confirmation of economic theory. Actually, I advance the stronger thesis that economics actually owes us an account of the behavior of individuals and that this makes it evident that economic theory should strive to cover the widest range of phenomena is reasonable. ;Chapter 3 takes this broadened notion of economic theory as a starting point and shows why the new outlook can be expected to enrich present theory and make progress towards the project of connecting economics to the phenomena. I include explanations of how prima facie difficulties with the new outlook overcome. In the course of doing this, many striking analogies between economics and linguistics, another science that closely related to psychology, are brought out. The relatively successful resolution of methodological problems in linguistics that parallel methodological problems in economics seems encouraging. ;Finally, Chapter 4 examines a bundle of problems concerning the relationship between microeconomics and macroeconomics. Most of the conclusions drawn in this chapter are negative: I argue that the connection between the micro and the macro is more difficult to fathom than many writers seem to imply. . . . UMI. (shrink)

BOOK REVIEWS 461 Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece: Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics" takes as its starting point Savan's claim that Spinoza is the "founder of scientific hermeneutics." Rejccting the most extreme interpretation of this claim -- i.e., that Spinoza created scientific hermeneutics ex nihilo -- Curlcy carefully compares Spi- noza's contributions to Biblical criticism with those of Hobbes and Isaac La Peyr~re, and concludes that Spinoza's work possesses, in addition to a generally higher level of hermeneutical (...) rigor, something quite specific that they do not -- namely, "a well worked-out theory of what is required for the interpretation of a text." This theory demands that we begin by applying to textual interpretation the Cartesian strategy of "removing all prejudices" and preconceptions; doing so allows us to interpret a text such as the Bible in the light of a "natural history," drawn from the resources of the text itself. Curley's essay is essential reading for anyone interested in hermencutics, Biblical criticism, Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, or Spinoza's general philoso- phy of science. Manfred Walthcr's related essay focuses more narrowly on a case in which the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus appears to violate its own requirement that scripture be interpreted through scripture itself. That case is the treatment of miracles, the Biblical reports of which Spinoza seems to discount on external and.. (shrink)